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The story of this man who had killed a messenger and hanged himself would 
make interesting reading. One could almost write a whole chapter on him. 
Perhaps not a whole chapter but a reasonable paragraph at any rate ... He had 
already chosen the title of the book, after much thought: The Pacification ofthe 
Primitive Tribes of the Lower Niger. (Things 117) 
Chinua Achebe's classic novel Things Fall Apart concludes with the above lines. 
The protagonist of the book, Okonkwo, has committed suicide, and upon finding the 
body, the English District Commissioner of the Lower Niger thinks that ''this man," who 
has had a whole book written about him, does not merit an entire chapter written about 
him (Things 117). In thinking this. the District Commissioner enters into one of the great 
conflicts between the West and Africa: the assumption that Africans have no sense of 
self, and, consequently, are not viable subjects (Writer 51-57). 
Writing about this, Achebe states: 
In the area of literature, I recall that we have sometimes been informed by 
the West and its local zealots tha,t the African novels we write are not 
novels at all because they do not quite fit the specifications of that literary 
form which came into being at a particular time in specific response to the 
new spirit of individual freedom set off by the decay of feudal Europe and 
the rise of capitalism. This form, we were told, was designed to explore 
individual rather than social predicaments. (54) 
The District Commissioner, in writing his proposed book, is representing some of the 
presuppositions about African texts that Ache be mentions-namely, the individual does 
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not matter, and so the story of one person who commits suicide is not worthy of a 
significant portion of a book. Following on Achebe's ideas on the individual and the 
novel will be my investigation of subjectivity, of the relation between the individual and 
the community, and of friendship and society. All of these, I want to suggest, are 
important concepts when reading Achebe's novel. 
In his essay entitled ''The Writer and His Community," Chinua Ache be in 
addressing the common opposition between the individual and community claims, "I am 
suggesting that what is at issue here is the principle which has come to be known as 
individualism and which has dominated the life and the psychology of the West in its 
modem history. The virtues of individualism are held to be universally 
beneficial ... particularly so to the artist" (Writer 49). As Mrican cultures have been 
marginalized by the West, his aim is to make readers of his fiction and nonfiction take 
seriously the texts and philosophies of African peoples. In writing Things Fall Apart, 
Achebe is trying to bring to the forefront the importance of subjectivity for the Igbo 
people. In order to display such subjectivity, Achebe represents the idea of the chi, whjch 
is, for all intents and purposes, the other self of the lgbo. In effect, he creates characters 
such as Okonkwo and Obierika, two men who have chis but who respond to them in 
different ways. While Okonkwo defies his, Obierika serves as the more exemplary 
subject and works with his chi. 
Although Western critics have long thought of African people as being formed 
solely by the community, Ache be attempts to prove these critics wrong. Once again in 
"The Writer and his Community," Achebe states that "Western literature played a central 
role in promoting the ideal of individual autonomy ... It promoted the view of society and 
of culture as a prisonhouse from which the individual must escape in order to find space 
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and fulfillment" (52-53). Achebe claims that the Igbo traditions present instead the chi, a 
unique and individuated model of subjectivity that is based upon a unique creator for 
each and every person. Things Fall Apart responds to this notion of society as 
imprisoning the individual by taking the example of Okonkwo, who follows what I would 
consider an absolutist path, one where there is no room for flexibility and ultimately leads 
to an excessively rigid model of subjectivity. i In contrast, the other main character in 
Achebe's text, Obierika, serves as Achebe's ideal critic and subject, due to the fact that 
he is accepting of difference and embraces inconsistency. What we find in the novel is an 
exploration, by means of characterization, that questions the social-individual dichotomy. 
While these two men are on different ends of the spectrum, where Okonkwo 
believes in an overarching sense of how life is to be lived, as opposed to Obierika who 
values social and individual differences and who seems to value the notions of chi that 
Achebe represents in the text, it is these specific qualities and differences that manifest 
themselves in these two men and thus creates a friendship that is grounded in differences 
rather than in similarities as Aristotle's theory of friendship would suggest. Their 
friendship, in fact, resonates very closely with the Derridean reading of Aristotle on 
friendship, a ·reading that makes the case for the notion that friends value each other's 
uniqueness and solitude, which holds very closely to Achebe's thoughts on chi. By 
looking at the chi, at Okonkwo as a subject, at Obierika as a subject, and lastly at their 
friendship of differences, my sense is that Ache be's own thoughts and model of 
subjectivity are grounded in the acceptance of differences and the ability to follow one's 
chi, despite the obstacles and difficult path that it might create for one along the way. 
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I. Achebets Vision of the Chi and of Subjectivity 
Chinua Achebe discusses the notion of the individual self in terms of chi. He 
defines chi "as [a person's] other identity in spiritland (Chi 159). Rather than being 
something within the self, it is instead a separate form. Achebe speaks of the importance 
of "duality" in lgbo culture, and he states, "Wherever Something stands, Something Else 
will stand beside it" (160), implying that there is never just the one and that the one is 
insufficient on its own. This other self is of equal importance as the being that lives in 
our world (160-161). He writes: 
The idea of individualism is sometimes traced to the Christian principle 
that God created all men and that consequently every one of them is 
presumed worthy in His sight. The lgbo do better than that. They 
postulate the concept of every man as both a unique creation and the work 
of a unique creator. Which is as far as individualism and uniqueness can 
possibly go! (Chi 164) 
One of the most fascinating aspect of chi that cannot be overlooked is that chi is the 
ultimate creator itself (164-165). In the Igbo language, the name for the god is Chi 
Ukwu, which means "Great Chi" (165). While Chi Ukwu is the "supreme" god, each 
person has his or her own separate self that allows a certain amount of self-creation (164-
166i. Although the chi is under control by Chi Ukwu, it is nonetheless one of the 
driving forces behind individual subjectivity. 
Chi is the_existence that, while living in "spiritland,'' plays a role in determining a 
person's quality of life. Even if a person tries his or her best to change a given situation, 
the chi can be unmoving, and despite the person's best effort, it is the chi that has the 
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final say, although "power so complete, even in the hands of chi, is abhorrent to the lgbo 
imagination" (162-163). Power in general is more evenly distributed in the Igbo culture, 
and they pride themselves on being egalitarian. However, in the case of chi, the specific 
individual creator for each person has a modicum of control over the life that he or she is 
to live. 
In Things Fall Apart, it is evident ~at the chi is concerned with the individual 
person's success in life. For example, upon being exiled from his community and 
realizing that his life is becoming tom at the seams, Okonkwo thinks to himself: 
He had been cast out of his clan like a fish on to a dry, sandy beach, 
panting. Clearly his personal god or chi was not made for great things. A 
man could not rise above the destiny of his chi. The saying of the elders 
was not true-that if a man said yes his chi also affirmed. Here was a man 
whose chi said nay despite his own affirmation. (Things 76) 
As Achebe states in the chi essay, "The lgbo believe that a man receives his gifts or 
talents, his character-indeed his portion in life-before he comes into the world" (Chi 
163). Despite it appearing as if the individual's life has been predetermined, Achebe tells 
us that the person can bargain with his or her chi (163). Questioning traditional wisdom, 
Okonkwo thinks that one cannot exceed one's chi. Evidently to him, Okonkwo's acts in 
life-whether it be the beating of his wives, or the scorning of his children, or even his 
outlook on life-constitute a path that was too narrow. Even though Okonkwo wants to 
do certain things, because his chi was not made to do it, he is never able to reach his 
personal goals, as they were not apportioned to him. For it is, as the narrator says, that if a 
man does not have a good chi then "evil fortune followed him to the grave" (12). 
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Chinua Ache be cites the chi as the strongest support for his claim that the Igbo 
have a better sense of individualized subjectivity than does the West. It is the chi's 
uniqueness and the subsequent belief that each person has his or her own fate that lead 
Ache be, and me, into the discussion of Mricans having, in fact, represented 
individualized subjectivity in their literature. Every single person in the Igbo world has a 
different portion in life; that which Okonkwo and his friend Obierika have, for example, 
cannot be the same, for they have different chis. Achebe believes that the Western 
prejudice that Mricans have no conception of a self is completely preposterous. The 
notion of conforming to one absolutist idea of how life is to be lived is negative, seeing 
that it is the absolutism that leads to the rigidity in society, while it is in fact individuality, 
as Things Fall Apart shows, that in fact leads to a resilient community. Rather than the 
Western belief that the society and individual can never coexist, Ache be's novel serves as 
the counterpoint: that it is the individuality of each person in a society that leads to its 
successful maintenance. 
II. Okonkwo and Absolutism 
Okonkwo serves as not only a protagonist and ''tragic hero" in Ache be's text; he 
also is there to display what negativity lies behind one being an absolutist and in the 
process how one can become an outcast. In the process, he does not understand the 
individuated apportioning that the Igbo truly point towards, and because he does not 
entertain ambiguity and change, he forces himself into a life that he does not want to see 
altered. He creates an imprisonment that the Igbo culture does not strive towards. His 
inability to be flexible in his beliefs and his incorrect notion that there is a single path that 
one is to follow stem from his hatred of his father, Unoka. Perhaps it is his supreme 
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loathing of his father which forces him to choose an inflexible path. As the narrator 
states, Unaka was considered an "unsuccessful [man]" for the fact that he never took a 
''title" within the Igbo land (Things 6). He was considered too "idle" because he was 
more interested in playing the flute and drinking (4-5, 10).1!1 Considered a near outcast 
because of his attitudes towards important matters such as war (he was against it because 
he was "a coward"), his father failed to leave his mark upon his passing (5-6). Okonkwo 
was ashamed of his father because of his lack of power in the community: 
Even as a little boy [Okonkwo] had resented his father's failure and 
weakness, and even now he still remembered how he had suffered when a 
playmate told him that his father was agbala. That was how Okonkwo 
first came to know that agbala was not only another name for a woman, it 
could also mean a man who had taken no title. (10) 
Consequently, he made it his life-long goal to go against all of the things that his father 
supposedly stood for, including "gentleness and .. .idleness" (10). 
In going against all of the things that his father held dearly, he begins on a path 
that he imagines can never be changed: one that finds him striving to be masculine and to 
be a leader in Umuofia. As the narrator states, "When Unaka died, he had taken no title at 
all and he was heavily in debt. Any wonder then that his son Okonkwo was ashamed in 
him? Fortunately, among these people a man was judged according to his worth and not 
according to the worth of his father" (6-7). In creating this destiny for himself, he fails to 
take a major part of Igbo tradition into account: his chi. He fails to listen to it, fails to 
negotiate with it, and in essence he refuses to live his life in any other way than he sees 
fit, and consequently he believes that everyone else should live their lives accordingly. 
Okonkwo clearly does not understand the concept of individuation that the chi represents. 
There are several instances in the text itself that show Okonkwo's inability to see 
life in any other way than the way that he sees best. One of the most crucial instances 
involves his relationship with his son Nwoye. Okonkwo has a strong dislike for his son 
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because there is "too much of his mother in him"; in other words, he is too feminine for 
his liking (40). In one of his conversations with Obierika, Okonkwo expresses his 
concerns for Nwoye. He tells Obierika, 
If! had a son like him [Maduka, Obierika's son] I should be happy. I am 
worried about Nwoye. A bowl of pounded yams can throw him in a 
wrestling match ... But I can tell you, Oberika, that my children do not 
resemble me .. .I have done my best to make Nwoye grow into a man, but 
there is too much of his mother in him. ( 40) 
Because Nwoye does not represent what Okonkwo believes every man should be like, he 
does not accept his son for who he is. Consequently he fails to respect the chi of others, 
including his own kin. The narrator states, "Okonkwo wanted his son to be a great farmer 
and a great man. He would stamp out the disquieting signs of laziness which he thought 
he already saw in him" (21). Even if the chi of his own son has him destined to be a man 
who was not a farmer in the mold of his father, it is still no excuse for him not to be like 
Okonkwo's idealized subject. On the other side of the equation, however, Okonkwo 
displays much happiness in his daughter Ezinma. He cares deeply for his daughter 
because she embodies the characteristics of the ideal man more than Nwoye does. He 
repeatedly says, throughout the novel, "'She should have been a boy"' (39). 
There comes a point in the book where Ezinma is taken by the priestess of the 
village and her life is in serious danger. Okonkwo senses this danger and follows her, 
despite the fact that one "[should not] speak when a god speaks ... " (60). Preserving his 
daughter for Okonkwo is in a sense the preservation of his masculinity and his absolutist 
beliefs; similarly with his son, there is a concern about masculinity and absolutism. 
However, when it comes to his son, he is not as willing to save him. This is best 
exampled when Nwoye converts to Christianity. Rather than trying to get him to return 
home or, in any way, trying to salvage their relationship, Okonkwo instead thinks, "that 
Nwoye was not worth fighting for ... To abandon the gods of one's father and go about 
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with a lot of effeminate men clucking like old hens was the very depth of abomination" 
(88). Because Nwoye is different from him and he rejects the beliefs of his ancestors, 
Okonkwo does not feel that his son deserves to be rescued. 
Okonkwo has a very clear sense of how one is supposed to live. The idea of a 
different apportioning of abilities to each person seems foreign. In consequence, 
Okonkwo believes in an unwarranted sense of absolutism because he thinks things should 
be a certain way and that everyone must arrange his or her life according to his way. 
Okonkwo believes everyone must conform to his ideas of a man that were formed and 
based on his fear of becoming like his father. 
In the same way that he forces those closest to him into a specific mold, Okonkwo 
forces his life into a form of masculinity that allows for no exceptions. In the process, 
Okonkwo fails to ever truly know his chi. Because he is so adamant in not being like 
Unaka, he does whatever it takes to do so, even if it means defying his own chi. This at 
first works out well for him, as he is successful in his community and appears poised for 
great things. However, upon becoming exiled from his community for accidentally 
killing a clansman, his life turns for the worse. Because "Okonkwo's gun had exploded 
and a piece of iron had pierced the boy's heart" (74), he is forced to leave Umuofia. In 
terms of chi, he does not deal realistically with what is involved in attaining success. 
Achebe's notion of chi would have it that he needs life changes. Okonkwo does not do 
this, however. He remains stubborn and will not change his ways, which would enU!il his 
being accepting of the differences of others and accepting their chis, as well as his own. It 
is not the community that is rigid; it instead is his interpretation of how a man is 
supposed to live that leads to his own imprisonment. While the community strives for 
each person to work with his or her own chi, Okonkwo does not understand this, and he 
subsequently creates a world where he is stuck conforming to beliefs that do not actually 
exist for most of the Igbo people represented in the novel. 
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One of the best examples of a person who understands his chi in less absolutist 
terms and who respects the uniqueness of others is Uchendu, Okonko's uncle. Uchendu 
believes that people have the right to be different, even if it seems somewhat dangerous. 
He demonstrates such tolerance of difference when the white colonizers come to a 
neighboring village, Abame, and wipe it o:ut because one of their comrades was killed. 
Even though these people are different and do not have the same culture as the Igbo, he 
believes that one should "'[n]ever kill a man who says nothing"' (81). He goes on to say, 
''Those men of Abame were fools. What did they know about the man? ... The world as 
no end, and what is good among one people is an abomination with others" (81-82). Even 
though these foreign men were different, they had the right to be so. Each person can be 
unique or as different as they are. Okonkwo, however, does not think in such a manner. 
He responds, ''They were fools ... They had been warned that danger was ahead. They 
should have armed themselves with their guns and their matchets even when they went to 
market" (81). Everyone should be like him and maintain a militant existence. 
Not only does Okonkwo refuse differences, but he also does not believe in the 
idea of negotiating with one's chi. He blames his misfortune not on his shortcomings, but 
on the chi itself. In a moment of free indirect discourse the narrator tells us, "He saw 
clearly in it [his misfortune] the finger of his personal god or chi. For how else could he 
explain his great misfortun~ and exile ... ?" (88) As opposed to believing that perhaps 
there is something wrong with the way that he is living his life and that there is 
something that he could do to mend his life, Okonkwo instead wallows in his sorrow and 
holds fast to his beliefs in a masculine absolutism. 
Okon.kwo thinks to himself, "His life had been ruled by a great passion-to 
become one of the lords of the clan. That had been his life-spring. He had been cast out 
of his clan like a fish ... Clearly his personal god or chi was not made for great 
things ... Here was a man whose chi said nay despite his own affirmation (76). It is 
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apparent at this point in the text that Okonkwo is in complete discord with his people's 
beliefs. As was said in Achebe's "Chi in Igbo Cosmology," the chi set[s] limit to man's 
aspirations (Writer 161). While at the beginning of the text all is good with Okonkwo (in 
his eyes, at least), by this point in the text he has reached a low point. The point gets 
even lower when his people fail to rally around him, and he consequently commits 
suicide (Things 115-117). As Okonkwo sees it, his chi is not properly aligned with his 
desire, and because of this, he finds himself conflicted and extremely unbalanced. He is 
unwilling to adjust his beliefs and negotiate with difference, and consequently his chi and 
his desires are irreconcilable. In this way, Okonkwo is unable to become an ideal Igbo 
subject and gain his own sense of self in the traditional Igbo sense. For reasons such as 
these, the chi gives us a philosophy according to which one is resilient. As we will later 
see with Obierika, one who does not challenge his chi is rather flexible; one goes with the 
course of life. 
For now I want to say that in the Igbo tradition, one attempts to work with the chi, 
which in itself promotes difference. Unlike the statement by Ache be at the beginning of 
this thesis, where Christians strive for unity under one God, the Igbo are all governed by 
separate ones, showing that they value what is good through unity or difference (Chi 
164). This Western model is far more similar to Okonkwo's view than is ~e traditional 
Igbo idea of chi. He believes that what he sees fitting is to be followed by everyone 
(including himself) under every circumstance. 
However, his culture says otherwise, and he neglects the chis of his people as well 
as his own by failing to attempt to negotiate with it when times are difficult. In this way, 
Okonkwo cannot be a normative Igbo subject, and consequently he is an outsider in 
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Achebe's text because he is unwilling to accept difference in the way that Obierika and 
the culture as a whole do. As I have mentioned, inconsistency and difference have no 
place in Okonkwo's world, and his efforts to.will his own success prove futile since there 
is really no absolute ideology to follow; he has created it himself through fear. The lgbo 
society is not one that desires to hide individual uniqueness; it is quite the contrary as the 
chi examples. It is Okonkwo's rather Western desire to conform to what he thinks his 
society wants that restrains him. The community and the individual are meant to work 
together, hand in hand in support of one another. As Achebe says, "Sometimes [the 
artist's] friends ... hear him working in the bush, so they come and sit with him and watch 
him carve. They give him advice telling him how to carve, even if they themselves do 
not know how. He is not offended by their suggestions" (58). The community supports 
the individual finding his or her uniqueness. Okonkwo does not comprehend this and is, 
consequently, an outsider in his own world. Achebe proves that the society does not 
imprison the individual; it is the individual who believes in absolutes who imprisons 
uniqueness. In order to further examine the model that Ache be argues in favor of, then, 
one of negotiations for success and with difference, we must examine Obierika, 
Okonkwo's countermodel in Achebe's novel. 
II. Obierika: the Social Critic and Exemplaryiv Subject 
To further grasp how the community and individual are in unison with one 
another, one must look closer at one of the text's central characters, Obierika. Obi erika 
serves a dual purpose in Ache be's text. He is simultaneously an exemplary subject and 
critical of his culture at the same time. In order to be an exemplary subject, Obierika must 
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show those traits of working with the chi and the traditions of the lgbo people that 
Achebe speaks of. To this end, Obierika accomplishes this very well. He knows how to 
live by the moral standards that his people hold dearly: he does not break laws of peace, 
does not defy the orders of gods, and, most importantly of all, he respects women and 
remembers his chi and negotiates with it. In fact, he looks to be the embodiment of lgbo 
codes of conduct. Everyone in Umuofia would be well served modeling their lives in 
such a manner. 
He understands the importance of women in the world, and although he knows 
that men are the dominant figures, he understands that the culture respects women, a 
concept that Okonkwo cannot grasp due to the fear of being ''feminine,. like his father. 
When speaking of one of the fallen clansmen, he states that "'[it] was always said that 
Ndule and Ozoemena had one mind' ... 'I remember when I was a young boy there was a 
song about them. He could not do anything without telling her.',. Okonkwo believes that 
because this man listened to his wife, he was inherently weak. However, Obierika retorts 
by saying, "He led Umuo:fia to war in those days,. (42). Here it is clear that Obierika 
embodies a very important concept in his Igbo world: that women have a definitive 
position that is not to be frowned upon or lessened. This idea of that women have a place 
in the lgbo world is a notion seemingly based upon dualism, a common theme in Igbo 
traditions, for it is said "where one thing stands, another stands beside it." Women must 
be important to the society, then, as a dualistic counter must complement the men. An 
exemplary character, Uchendu, Okonkwo's uncle, sums up this belief best: 
It's true a child belongs to its father. But when a father beats his child, it 
seeks sympathy in its mother's hut. A man belongs to his fatherland when 
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things are good and life is sweet. But when there is sorrow and bitterness, 
he finds refuge in his motherland. Your mother is there to protect you. She 
is buried there. And that is why we say that mother is supreme. (78) 
One of the key things that one must do in order to be considered exemplary in the lgbo 
world is to respect women and to acknowledge that there are certain amounts of 
femininity in men. However, men are not to be too feminine, as evidenced by Obierika's 
stating to Okonkwo that "I am not afraid of blood; and if anyone tells you that I am, he is 
telling a lie." (41) Although saying this, he understands that does not mean women are to 
be abused and thought of in a poor light, as the dualistic nature of the traditions makes a 
female counterpart assume great importance, and respect towards them is therefore a 
necessity. Such cultural values are things that Obierika understands, and because of this, 
he is the exemplary lgbo man: he fully grasps how the way his world means to live, and 
he incorporates its values in his everyday life. 
The other key thing that Oberika does to be an exemplary Igbo subject is that he 
negotiates with his chi in a way that is expected of the lgbo people. When things do not 
go well for him, he shows resiliency. He has proven resilient in the face of the death of 
his twin daughters because he knows that it is, unfortunately, in the best interests of his 
people; in essence, then, resiliency is necessary (74). He thinks to himself that, ,.,.he 
Earth had decreed that they were an offence on the land and must be destroyed. And if 
the clan did not exact punishment for an offence against the great goddess, her wrath was 
loosed on all the land ... As the elders said, if one finger brought oil it soiled the others" 
(74). He also does not fret when the colonizers arrive to change the village (99-100), and 
follows the tribe's rules of burial, even though the dead is his closest friend (116-117). 
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He exemplifies the lizard of Igbo lore: "if it lost its tail it soon grew another'' (97). His 
resiliency allows him to be successful in life. The Igbo man is to work with his chi, and 
one experiences either success or failure depending on how one works with his other self. 
Because Obierika appears prosperous and successful throughout the entire text (as 
opposed to Okonkwo who suffers a tragic turn of events), he has either respected his chi 
from its onset or has done the necessary things in order to reconcile and negotiate with it. 
For such reasons, Obierika is Achebe's exemplary Igbo subject: he follows the cultural 
values and negotiates with and honors his chi. 
While Obi erika respects his chi and is exemplary, it does not necessarily mean 
that he agrees with every aspect of the culture and its practices. In '"For Chinua Achebe: 
The Resilience and the Predicament of Obierika," Biodun Jeyifo writes about Obierika, 
and the relationship that he has with his community as a whole. Jeyifo asks Achebe in a 
face-to-face interview whether Obierika was meant to represent the author himself. 
Achebe responds by saying: 
The answer is yes, in the sense that at the crucial moment when things are 
happening, he represents this other alternative .. . The culture says you 
must be strong, you must be this and that, but when the moment comes for 
absolute strength the culture says no, hold it!... Obierika is therefore more 
subtle and more in tune with the danger, the impending betrayal by the 
culture. (Jeyifo 500) 
Achebe's claim is evidenced by Obierika's thought processes. The example that comes to 
mind for me is when Oberika speaks to Okonkwo about Ikemefuna. Okonkwo asks why 
Obierika did not take part in the murder of Ikemefuna. In the dialogue that ensues, 
Katz 16 
Obierika tells Okonkwo, "'What you have done will not please the Earth. It is the kind of 
action for which the goddess wipes out whole families,. (Things 41). Okonkwo responds 
by saying that he had to do it because he was called upon to do so (41). Obierika's final 
statement on this is: "'That is true ... But if the oracle said that my son should be killed I 
woilld neither dispute it nor be the one to do it'" (41). Here Obierika can see that bad 
things can happen from following the culture in absolutist ways.lf one does things that 
the culture asks, they can "betray" (Jeyifo 500) him and the entire village. Although the 
culture asks for such cruel acts, it does not mean that they are right. Obierika, then, 
serves quite an interesting purpose in the novel: he is a social critic. Jeyifo writes that 
Obierika is a "humane" and "sensitive'" man, one who is able to discern what is going on 
in the society and is able to decide what must be done at any particular moment (500-
501). At the high point of the essay, Jeyifo makes the statement that Obierika is a man 
"divided,'' one who represents, "cultural affinnation and on the other hand cultural 
critique and deflation" (502-504). Consequently, Jeyifo considers Obierika to be a "[a] 
medium through which identity is negotiated between the self and others" (501). 
Expanding on this idea of "cultural affinnation" and simultaneous critique, Jeyifo 
explains, "Things Fall Apart may be regarded in this respect as a vast doxological 
compendium of Igbo culture before the advent of colonialism" (504). In other words, the 
text is a way of presenting the ways of life for the Igbo. However, the text serves another 
purpose: it serves to critique the culture that it already has in place, before the colonists 
arrived. Jeyifo states, "For one pole is freighted with the discourse of the postcoloniality 
of nationalist assertion against colonial and imperial subjugation ... the other pole is 
infused with the discourse of the critique of nationalism ... " (504). In other words, this 
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text is not only a look into the ways of life that the Igbo lived before the colonists arrived; 
it also shows that the life before had its problems as well. In such a way, Obierika serves 
to prove such a point: he enjoys the life he has, but he is critical of the way things occur 
in his village nonetheless. 
For Jeyifo, Obierika is a critic of the world around him. As was stated, he is able 
to distinguish between what the community holds in high regard but is also able to come 
to grips with the idea that changes/critiques might be necessary for the good of the 
people. This is best shown in some of his interactions with Okonkwo, who is not as 
flexible and is unable to deal constructively with significant changes. As opposed to 
Okonkwo who has a very inflexible idea of how his people are to live, Obierika respects 
the chi of each person and follows cultural norms, but he simultaneously questions the 
things he finds inconsistent. 
In one instance that was briefly mentioned before, Obierika shows personal 
judgment towards the end of the text when Okonkwo has committed suicide. He knows 
quite well that the Igbo tradition does not ·have a place for those who have killed 
themselves (117). Obierika is aware that touching the corpse of one who has taken his 
life is "an offence against the earth" (117). At this point, it seems as if his traditional 
roots are completely in control of his reaction. Obierika, however, takes a sharp turn 
from tradition and makes a statement that comes from his own heart. He exclaims," That 
man was one of the greatest men in Umuofia. You drove him to kill himself; and now he 
will be buried like a dog ... "(117). From a statement such as this, it is clear that 
although Obierika does not agree with the ·way in which Okonkw<? handles himself, he 
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nonetheless finds it a travesty that a man of his social position should be disrespectfully 
buried because of his tribe's laws. 
It is here where Obierika proves to be a critic of his people. As Jeyifo points out, 
Obierika, although willing to follow the traditional paths, wants to do whatever it takes 
for his society to survive, and if this entails that one go along a path that is less than 
desirable, it must be done (502-504). Obierika is able to respect the culture that he was 
brought up in, but he is simultaneously able to judge whether it is right or wrong. It is 
these decisions that allow him to be "resilient." This resiliency stems from the fact that 
Obierika,like some of the people in the tribe, do not actually see a problem with 
everything that is going on around them, such as the incursion of colonial officials and 
missionaries (Things 98-99). The narrator states, "But apart from the church, the white 
men had also brought a government. .. The white man had indeed brought a lunatic 
religion, but he has also built a trading store and for the first time palm-oil and kernel 
became things of great price, and much money flowed into Umuofia" (99-101). In fact, 
rather than seeing all of the change as a negative, Obierika sees this as an opportunity: a 
chance to gain a new subjectivity, one that allows him to follow his personal beliefs and 
those of his people, so that he would not actually be defying anything (Jeyifo 502). 
As was said earlier, he finds many problems in his current tradition. He goes so 
far as to ask himself when Okonkwo accidentally kills a man and his house is being tom 
down, "Why should a man suffer so grievously for an offence he had committed 
inadvertently?'' (Jeyifo 503, Things 74). It is during instances such as these that the new 
way of life might not seem so terrible after all (502-504). Jeyifo says that Obierika "[has] 
worldly and human-centered skepticism ... " (508). Obierika appears to be the perfect 
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social critic according Jeyifo: he supports his people, but he still sees problems and 
subsequently sees what must be done for his people to survive, an attribute that Okonkwo 
clearly lacks (500-504). However, Obierika is not only a social critic; he also exemplifies 
how one is to live if one is to honor one's chi. He shows resilience (as Jeyifo puts it) and 
weathers the course of things. The reason for such is because as an Igbo subject, such 
resiliency i~ necessary in order for the people of Umuofia to survive, despite whether one 
agrees with what the natural path is. Okonkwo, on the other hand, clearly cannot do this, 
as he fights to the death so as to not deviate from the way he wants things to be, rather 
than the way things are beginning to become. 
Obierika, then, serves as two different subjects in the text: he is the exemplary 
Igbo man, and he is also Achebe's model of the social critic, which are two very different 
things. In the context of the novel, he follows the tradition and his own chi respecting the 
fact that everyone has a destiny that is different than his own. This is what the lgbo 
desire; they desire a person who follows respects his or her chi and respects the 
uniqueness of others, whether male or female. Achebe adds something else to his own 
personal view of subjectivity, however; this person must be able to question the cultural 
norms and be able to see the inconsistencies and problems with the culture. 
Consequently, Achebe's ideal subject is one who is able to question, one who knows that 
the culture is not perfect and is in need of change. For such reasons, I believe that 
Obierika is the ideal subject for two different trains of thought: the lgbo's and Achebe's 
own. 
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VII. Aristotle and Derrida 
Achebe's reading of Christianity is one that, according to him, sees it as tending 
towards deemphasizing differences between persons. Having one creator, one single 
entity that produces all, emphasizes similarity, he argues, much more than does the Igbo 
notion of chi as a unique creator for each person. This creates the "prisonhouse," the 
structure that forces individuals to shy away from uniqueness and strive towards a unified 
sense of self. In Things Fall Apart, Ache be dramatizes at least a few characters who 
embrace their own difference, and at least one friendship that appears to be based on 
difference. This may, in tum, be read as dramatizing philosophical difference with 
Western tradition. Aristotle, on friendship, for example, suggests that a friendship is 
based upon the similarities within the people, and that only in sameness can a bond be 
fully tied. Interestingly, the contrasting notion of friendship that Achebe dramatizes 
resonates with Jacques Derrida's rereading of Aristotle, one which tends towards the 
notion that friendship is based on difference and the respect for difference, not sameness. 
However, one must start with the traditional reading of Aristotle in order to fully grasp 
his thoughts on friendship. 
Aristotle's discussion of friendship begins with Aristotle saying that the perfect 
friendship is based upon resemblance in virtue. The reason for its being perfect is because 
it is a friendship not founded on superficiality; instead, it is based on a true respect for the 
other person (219-220). The reason that these friends like each other is because they see 
the same virtues in one another, and thus want to form bonds because they find 
similarities in their virtues (219-220). These sorts of friendships last for a long period of 
time, because ''friendship lasts as long as [the friends] are good'' (220), and because this 
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sense of good is based on inherent virtues, it is assumed that these traits never leave. 
These sorts of friendships are highly uncommon, and the reason for this is because they 
take a very long time to fonn, as they require a deep knowledge of the other person and 
the virtues that he or she has (220). Aristotle even goes so far to say, "One cannot extend 
friendship to or be a friend of another person until each partner has impressed the other 
that he is worthy of affection" (220). Friendships are few and far between because they 
require a deep knowledge of what the other person stands for, and this of course takes a 
great deal of time. 
After his discussion of a perfect friendship, Aristotle speaks of such friendships as 
involving a notion that he describes as "self love" in Book IX. The reason that one is 
drawn to others is because one sees his or her own virtues in the other party (252-253). A 
friend is sort of like a reflection, "another self," an essential extension of the individual 
(253). One who is able to take care of himself and do what is best for himself sees such 
qualities in the other person; they share this virtue. Thus, sharing of virtues is loving of 
the self, as it is seeing the same virtues that one possesses in the other person that creates 
these bonds of perfect friendship (252-253). 
Aristotle then uses the idea of a perfect friendship as the basis for the relationships 
found in a commonwealth. Aristotle does not call this friendship, however: he calls it 
"concord" (256). The distinguishing factor between a perfect friendship and concord is 
that one need not know everyone within the commonwealth to reach concord. Rather than 
being a sharing of virtues, which requires a deep knowledge of the other individual, it 
instead requires a sharing of opinions on topics concerning the commonwealth (256). For 
instance, "there is concord in a state when all citizens decide that the offices should be 
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elective, or that an alliance should be concluded with the Spartans" (256). A 
commonwealth necessitates having citizens in concord with one another, as these 
opinions on matters lead to the creation of goals for the state (257). With a common goal 
that has been reached due to concord, the state can achieve "what is important for life" 
(2S7). Concord, then, is similar to friendship because it is ''friendship among fellow 
citizens" (257). 
Having explained the commonwealth as being related to the perfect friendship, 
Aristotle describes the less perfect forms of friendship: the ones that are not based on a 
similarity in virtue. He outlines in detail one such friendship that is what he tenns 
"unequal." It is unequal because one party has much power over the other, as is the case 
with a ruler and his people (227). Aristotle explains that, because these individuals are in 
such different positions within society, ''the virtue or excellence and the function of each 
partner is different, and the cause of their affection, too, is different .. .It is clear that the 
partners do not receive the same thing from one another and should not seek to receive it" 
(227). Friendship between those who are unequal cannot be built on similarity in virtue or 
in what one wishes to get from the other, as those in different positions will naturally 
have d:ifferent sets of values (227). Nevertheless, Aristotle still maintains that equality is 
a necessity for any sort of friendship to be true (227). In order to find equality in unequal 
relationships, he states that these individuals must be equalized by proportional amounts 
of love and benefits (227-228). In other words, one must always try to give more than one 
receives, for they might not be giving equal amounts, but the "merit" behind the giving is 
what is key; it is the ''thought that counts." Aristotle claims, "For when the affection is 
proportionate to the merit of each partner, there is in some sense equality between them" 
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(227). While the individuals might not be on equal footing, if they give as much as they 
can, then there is a sense of equality that is created amongst them (227-228). 
The other imperfect form of friendship Aristotle outlines is that of one that is 
based on pleasure or utility. While a perfect friendship is one based on a sharing of 
virtues and good, a lesser friendship is one that may be based upon one's ability to be 
useful (221). These types of friendship cannot possibly last as long as one that involves a 
similarity in virtue, as when one party ceases being useful to the other, there is no longer 
reason for the relationship to continue (221). Aristotle does concede that such friendships 
can last if there are similarities amongst the people; however, because it entails "what is 
profitable," there is no true grounding in the relationship that can be maintained (221). 
This idea is summed up best by Aristotle's idea that, "[t]hose whose friendship is based 
on the useful dissolve as soon as it ceases to be to their advantage, since they were friends 
not of each other but of what was profitable for them" (221). 
In examining Aristotle in his traditional readings, it is clear that the key theme in 
relationships is similarity between those who are in relationship with one another. 
Aristotle cites that the only way a perfect friendship can be possible is through sharing 
the same virtues, for it is in this way that one can "love the other's character'' (221). One 
who is able to love oneself can be friends with another person because one sees one's self 
in the other person, and a sharing of virtues becomes evident. A similar sense of 
friendship is evident in a commonwealth because it is a society of people with similar 
ideas and who strive for the same goal. This concord and agreement is similar to that 
sharing of virtue and good found in the perfect friendship, as it is the commonality of 
either goals or in values that creates and bonds such relationships. 
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One author who has called traditional readings of Aristotle into question is 
Jacques Derrida. In The Politics of Friendship, Derrida constantly teases readers with the 
question of "how many,'' asking traditional readers of Aristotle how many friends one can 
actually have. Derrida cannot accept the idea that friendships are based on similarities 
because of the fact that a commonwealth is based on perfect friendships. While 
traditionalists aim for concord in their communities, Derrida does not think that concord 
can be the basis of commonwealths for a simple reason: no one can come to agreement 
with or be friends with that large amount of people. Thus, the idea that a government and 
decision-making can be built on common interests or shared virtues cannot be. Derrida 
then looks at one traditional reader of Aristotle, Cicero, and examines his train of thought 
and his quest for finding similarity in Aristotle's relationships. 
Cicero believes that the friend is one who is exactly like the person in question. 
He is of the mind that one's friend is essentially a perfect replica of the original person 
(Derrida 4). This idea of the friend being exactly like the original person is what forms 
Cicero's thoughts on friendship: he defines it as '"our own image'" (4). Cicero reads 
Aristotle very traditionally: Men desire what is good, and what is good is friendship. 
Therefore, friendship is dependent on the individuals' desire to find similarities in his 
fellow man, and a commonwealth is based on a similar sense of concord. Thus, friendship 
traditionally involves similarities. 
Derrida, however, finds great contradiction in this reading of Aristotle, and he 
points out several instances in which Aristotle speaks not of sameness, but rather of 
difference as being that which brings friends together. He finds proof of this in Aristotle's 
own writings: that two people in a relationship are going to be inherently different, as one 
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who loves is a far different position from the one who is loved. In the original text, 
Aristotle writes, "For lover and beloved do not find pleasure in the same objects: the 
lover finds it in seeing his beloved, while the beloved receives it from the attention paid 
to him by his Iovern (Aristotle 221). Derrida uses this as an opportunity to point out the 
fact that there is an inherent difference among those who are friends. 
Because, "[t]he friend is the person who loves before being the person who is 
"loved,u such friends are striving for different goals. As opposed to good that 
traditionalists look for in Aristotle, which is commonality in goals, Derrida points out that 
Aristotle himself states that there must be difference for friendship to occur, as there is 
not a common goal; instead, these friends are quite different. 
Unlike the traditional reading of Aristotle, where the commonalities are 
emphasized, Derrida pursues and suggests that friends are those who are different from 
one another, as each friendship is one that must be singularly proven over time. Aristotle 
himself says, "One cannot extend friendship to or be a friend of another person until they 
have eaten the specified [measure] of salt together" {Aristotle 220). By this, Aristotle 
means to say that a friendship takes time to develop because these friends must have gone 
through experiences with one another {220-221). Derrida, however, states that it is this 
exact idea of a time commitment that prevents friends from seeking similarities in one 
another, for if it were the similarities being desired, friends would be easy to find and 
would take no time at all. He proposes, in fact, that friends are these who protect one 
another's solitude and singularity, both characteristics that are defined by difference 
(Derrida 35). One cannot have too many friends, then, as there is not enough time in 
one's life to develop that many friendships. It takes time to develop these bonds because 
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one must examine the differences in the other party and see if he or she is worth bonding 
over. Aristotle is hinting that sameness cannot be the basis of friendship, then, as 
sameness would lead to us being friends with everyone around us. 
Derrida finds more indications that friendship is not based on similarity in 
Aristotle's discussion of the time frame for friendships. Aristotle writes: 
To be friends with many people, in the sense of perfect friendship, is impossible, 
just as it is impossible to be in love with many people at the same time. For love 
is like an extreme. an extreme that tends to be unique ... Also, one must have some 
experience of the other person and have come to be familiar with him, and that is 
the hardest thing of all (225). 
Derrida claims that this is key to respecting difference amongst people, as these 
relationships take a long time to form, and thus one cannot be friends with too many 
people at a time (Derrida 21). If one sought out similarity, then friends would be 
relatively easy to find because the process of getting to know the other person would be 
easy. This is impossible, though, because each person must take time to know the other, 
and this is because each person is in fact different; Aristotle himself says this (Aristotle 
220). This, then, suggests that because each friendship is between people who are 
different, each friendship is unique in its own right and singular. For Derrida, "We are 
first of all, as friends, the friends of solitude, and we are calling on you to share what 
cannot be shared: solitude. We are friends of an entirely different kind, inaccessible 
friends, friends who are alone because they are incomparable and without common 
measureu (35). Friends are not those who desire the same things, then: they are those who 
desire the differences in one another, who respect the "solitudes" of each other, the 
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uniqueness of their partner. Derrida, therefore, sees tensions in Aristotle's writing about 
friendship, tensions which contradict traditional reading. From these tensions, and using 
other Western philosophers as well, Derrida discusses friends as valuing uniqueness, as 
every friendship, due to the fact that it takes time to develop, must be different and 
involve differences between the people. Otherwise, it would be possible for one to be 
friends with everyone, which Aristotle himself says is not possible. 
Even within a friendship, sameness cannot be achieved because each party is 
receiving something different, a different sort of goal. For example, if one friend gives 
the other money, they receive different things: one gets the money, and the other gets 
honor. However, these are not equal gifts, as the honor is greater than the money. 
Consequently, even in a perfect friendship, these friends are differentiated from one 
another because they are not looking for the same result nor do they achieve the same 
things. Thus, friendships entail finding uniqueness in one another, as every person in 
every relationship is destined to achieve something different within the specific 
relationship. 
Going even further, Derrida states that friends are differentiated from one another 
because when one gives, the other gets, which creates an inherent difference. In a similar 
vein, similarities among friends and a community as a whole prove impossible because 
each man is not only different from his friend, but is different from himself as well. 
Derrida says, although one may be considered a certain trait, that one is also not that trait. 
For instance, one can be a male. In being a male, one might reject certain aspects of being 
male and consequently not be completely male. One could then say that, "I am a male, 
but I am also not a male." In doing so, each person is different from himself. In the text 
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entitled Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques De"ida, author John 
D. Caputo discusses a conversation that he had with Derrida. In this conversation, 
Derrida stated, "'I am European ... [b]ut I am not, nor do I feel, European in every part, 
that is, European through and through.'" (Caputo 214-215) Caputo responds by saying 
that, "Derrida does not renounce the idea of cultural identity ... but he wants such identity 
to be internally differentiated, so that one is not identical with oneself, so marked by a 
'difference with itself' that the very idea of 'we' is destabilized" (214-215). Derrida 
means to say that one cannot fully be a specific category but is always in some sense 
different from any category, and hence different from the self who identifies with the 
category. 
In the process, an important point becomes apparent: if one is different from 
one's self, it is difficult to categorize friends as "similar" when each is internally 
differentiated. People cannot be categorized, there can be no "we" or "they" because each 
individual is not only self-differentiated, but is consequently different from his fellow 
man. Therefore, the commonwealth cannot be based upon similarities as traditional 
Aristotelian readers posit; it must instead be based upon difference because each man has 
different goals, receives different things in friendships, and is different from himself. A 
relationship takes time to develop because one must know the differences of the other 
party deeply; friends are different from one another for such reasons, and they strive to 
know the other's unique solitudes, and such is the· essence of friendship for Derrida: 
difference and the respect of it are necessities, as a relationship based upon sameness 
would not be friendship at all because if this were true, one would have many friends that 
would be made very quickly, as like would recognize like. This is impossible, though, as 
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Aristotle himself says that relationships take time to develop. Consequently. because 
concord in a community is built on the perfect friendship, the commonwealth's structure 
must be based on difference in the same way that a friendship is. At the end, Derrida 
hopes that the West can learn to read itself as a culture that respects difference, and he is 
hopeful that the philosophers of the future can learn to find uniqueness as the key threads 
in relationships. 
VIII. Friendship in Achebe 
Ache be writes of a friendship in his text that is clearly not Aristotelian in the 
sense of the traditional readings; Okonkwo and Obierika are in fact incredibly different 
from one another. While the casual reader may say that they only differ in a few key 
aspects of their lives, there are several key things that distinguish their modes of living 
from one another. First of all, the men have two very different motivations for living their 
lives the ways that they do. As has been stated previously. Okonkwo's reason for living 
his life is for the purpose of self-creation and such a motivation stems from fear. Early on 
in the text, we find that his fear stems from his father. Our narrator says: 
But his whole life was dominated by fear, the fear of failure and weakness. 
It was deeper and more intimate than the fear of evil and capricious gods 
and of magic ... Okonkwo's fear was fear was greater than these. It was not 
external but lay deep within himself. It was the fear of himself, lest he 
should be found to resemble his father. Even as a little boy he had resented 
his father's failure and weakness ... And so Okonkwo was ruled by one 
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passion-to hate everything that his father Unaka had loved. One of these 
things was gentleness and another was idleness (l'hings 10) 
From lines such as these, we learn that Okonkwo's motivation for life is not the typical 
Igbo notion of following chi; instead, it is to create a destiny that is his own based on his 
dismay for Unoka. Appropriately, Okonkwo then proceeds to live his life in the least 
feminine way possible; he becomes an accomplished wrestler (18), grows yams because 
they are "manly" (21), threatens one of his wives because she says he is not good with a 
gun (24-25), and even goes so far as to kill his foster son for his fear of"being thought 
weak" (38). A desire to be the epitome of masculinity motivates his life. 
Conversely, Obierika does not appear to be a man driven by fears and hatred. 
Obierika seems much more content to let his life play out; rather than being a self-
creationist, he is more traditional in terms of honoring chi. If things are not the way he 
believes they should be, he is content to let them work themselves out. While Okonkwo 
shows a great fea,r for his son's being too feminine, Obi erika believes that the children 
should not be pushed into masculinity. He states, "You worry yourself for nothing ... The 
children are still very young" (40). In contrast to Okonkwo's worry about being 
masculine and his children's masculinity, Obierika is not concerned with such trivial 
matters. He instead is focused much more on the wellbeing of the community and 
showing it in his critique of his village's hypocrisy. He shows this in his being critical of 
the codes of conduct, as Jeyifo has pointed out previously. For example, when Okonkwo 
states that there is a "law of the land [that] must be obeyed," Obierika says, "I don't know 
how we got that law ... In many other clans a man of title is not forbidden to climb the 
palm tree but he can tap the short ones standing on the ground" (42). Obierika believes 
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his society has many inconsistencies in it, and accordingly serves to point such things out 
to people of his village and the readers of the text. For such a reason, he is far less 
concerned with looking masculine or feminine; his life consists of following the rules but 
of being critical of them for the good of the community; thus, his main purpose is the 
preservation of chi and preserving the resiliency of Umuofia, as opposed to Okonkwo 
whose purpose is to be as masculine as possible, despite the fact that it might hurt himself 
and/or the community as a whole. 
Other key differences that these men share is that a) one becomes exiled from his 
community, while the other does not, b) one suffers much hardship, reaches success, and 
then loses it, while we do not see any failure from the other, and c) one has respect for 
women, while one clearly shows disdain for them. However, all of these differences stem 
from the initial difference I pointed out: Okonkwo is driven by fear while Obierika is 
driven by a desire to respect chi and to see his village succeed in the long run. Such 
differences create a major divide between the characters, and thus they make it very clear 
that these men are different from one another. Thus, they cannot have a bond that is based 
on similarities. It is clear that if these men are to be considered friends, it would most 
certainly be through the lens of Derrida's reading of Aristotle. The· question then arises, 
however: are Okonk:wo and Obierika really friends? 
My answer to this is a definitive "yes," but only for one side. For Obierika is 
accepting of the differences of Okonkwo, but Okonkwo does not believe in the same 
acceptances. However, Obierika is still a friend to Okonkwo through these differences, 
and this friendship manifests itself in several ways. When Okonkwo is sen~ into exile, it 
is Obierika who takes care of his property (Things 74). When Okonkwo's body is found, 
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it is Obierika who stands up for him, despite the fact that he does not agree with the 
suicide or the way in which Okonkwo conducted himself in life (117). Okonkwo, then, 
would be the loved. He is the one receiving the affection, the one whose differences and 
values are being respected no matter how outlandish they may be. He is unwavering in 
his beliefs, and he refuses to see any other sides to a problem. Obierika understands the 
concept that giving and receiving are different, and thus he knows that there will always 
be differentiations in relationships. As opposed to the Cicerian reading, which would say 
Okonkwo and Obierika would strive to find the same virtues, Derridean reading makes 
much more sense. The lens of Derrida would suggest that they are friends (or that 
Obierika is a friend, at least) because it is a friendship based on the respecting of one 
another's uniqueness and solitudes. In the same way, the community of Umuofia is 
founded on the same system of values. 
As was stated previously in the thesis, Achebe envisions the community as 
supporting the individual artist that follows his or her own path. This, strangely enough, 
is not ~ecessarily how Umuofia as a whole is constructed. While Obierika is critical of 
the way his world works and can accept differences, not everyone in the society can. 
Characters such as Chielo, the one who takes Ezinma to her potential death, are strict 
adherents to the codes of conduct are not as flexible in their views of the village's virtues. 
For every flexible character like Uchendu, who states, ''We have albinos among us. Do 
you think that they came to our clan by mistake, that they have strayed from their home 
to a land where everybody is like them?" (82), there is a restrained character like 
Okonkwo. Umuofia, while it might in fact be a village that is grounded in valuing the 
differences and uniqueness of everyone, is not exactly a village that is accepting of 
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difference as a whole. While the Igbo might believe in difference in their cultural 
doctrine, it does not mean that everyone in the village follows it. Subsequently, Obierika 
serves as the exemplary subject for the Igbo people in the village, as he represents what 
his people are supposed to be but are not necessarily like. Achebe is being critical of his 
people as a whole, and Obierika is he character who shows how Achebe envisions his 
ideal man. His acceptance of differences allows him to not only be friends with 
Okonkwo, but to be a fully immersed member of his community, as his acceptance of 
values allows him to fully integrate himself. 
In becoming an exemplary subject, he proves to be a great friend of Okonkwo. He 
is able to be with him through the good times and the bad, as was pointed out previously. 
Because he is able to still see such differences in himself and in Okonkwo, but is able to 
still support him no matter what, Obierika proves to be a friend to Okonkwo. While 
Okonkwo is not a friend, in the Derridean reading of Aristotle, to his counterpart, as he 
does not respect differences in the way Obierika does, and consequently does not really 
support him, Obierka nonetheless stays a friend to him and follows the Derridean lines of 
friendship, even though the dedication is not reciprocated. In looking at Derrida, it 
becomes interesting to note that his vision of uniqueness and the respect for solidarity is 
very similar to Ache be's idea of each person having a unique chi. It is the differences in 
each person that are valued; not the sameness. Although traditional Western doxa, 
according to Achebe, constrain the individual and his uniqueness, it seems to be just the 
opposite. The man who respects difference is the one who becomes integrated into his 
community, whereas the man who is absolutist and inflexible never links with the 
member of his world in friendship or community. 
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IX. Conclusion 
I now return to the epigraph at the beginning of this thesis, the statement 
involving the English District Commissioner. In claiming that Okonkwo did not merit a 
full chronicle of his life, the Commissioner is adopting the typical Western thought that 
there is a lack of uniqueness in Igbo individuality. Ache be writes his famous novel as a 
response to critics like the commissioner and to the West as a whole. Things Fall Apart 
serves to show just how individualized the Igbo culture attempts to be, and it shows the 
consequence of how one who attempts to avoid the individuality of one's self and others 
suffers dire consequences. 
Achebe's vision of the Igbo in terms of individuality is rather simple: he posits 
that because of the chi and the desire to adhere to its principles, the Igbo have a great 
respect for uniqueness. The West, while usually imagined as being in favor of 
individuality, according to Ache be does not posit as unique a sense of the self as it 
claims, as it has one creator overall, while each lgbo person has his or her own creator. 
However, when looking at Derrida and his reading of respect for differences in Aristotle, 
the West and the Igbo do not seem so far apart. 
At the end of this investigation, three main conclusions can be reached. First and 
foremost, Achebe has proven to us through Things Fall Apart that the Mrican lgbo have, 
in fact, a very individualized notion of subjectivity. It is in their unwritten doctrine that 
the uniqueness of each person be respected due to the fact that the chi of each individual 
person is completely different. Secondly, it has become clear that not only was Ache be 
correct in saying that the Igbo value uniqueness, but that the entire communal structure of 
Igbo villages is built upon such a respect for differences. It is contrary to what Achebe 
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claims the West aims towards, then: society is not a prison that intends to restrain the 
individual from being him or herself; instead, the community is respectful and supportive 
of the individual person, much in the way that the artist is supported by the people around 
the artist as he or she works. Lastly, it is through the idea of friendship in the Derridean 
reading of Aristotle that the friendship of Obierika and Okonkwo becomes possible, as 
the friendship for Obierika is one involving uniqueness and the respecting of each 
person's individuality. In this respecting of solitudes between these two characters, we 
come full circle to the original claim by Achebe that the lgbo value uniqueness above all 
else. 
I come to the final conclusion that Achebe's notion of chi and the respect for 
uniqueness that it posits is very similar to Derrida's reading of Artistotle and the respect 
for individuality that it points towards. While it may in fact be true that the generalized 
West that Ache be describes in "The Writer and His Community" is not accepting of 
differences in ways that the lgbo prove to be, it would be incorrect to say that the entire 
West lacks respect for individuality. For it is apparent that certain readings of one of the 
most recognized Western thinkers believes in the acceptance of difference and bases the 
entire idea of friendship and community on difference. The lgbo and the West, then, are 
not really that far apart in where they stand in regards to individualized subjectivity, then. 
For as has been discussed, chi and the Aristotelian respect for the uniqueness are, for all 
intents and purposes, extremely close: they serve to show that the individuality of every 




i According to the Oxford English Dictionary, an absolutist is "A person who holds 
certain principles to be absolute and unconditional, without exception or compromise". 
ii Akunna explains the relation between Chi Ukwu or Chukwu in the following manner: 
"We make sacrifices to the little gods, but when they fail and there is no one else to turn 
to we to Chukwu. It is right to do so. We approach a great man through his servants. But 
when his servants fail to help us, then we go to the last source of hope. We appear to pay 
greater attention to the little gods but that is not so. We worry them more because we are 
afraid to worry their master" (Things 102) 
iii Abiola Irele takes a different view of this. According to him, "[i]n the immediate 
context of the novel, Unaka's refusal to conform to the prevailing ethos of the tribe is of 
course considered in wholly negative terms. More important, its subversive significance 
is forcefully repudiated by his son ... who wills himself into becoming the antithesis of 
all that Unaka represents" (Irele 466) 
iv According to the Oxford English Dictionary, exemplary means, "Serving as a model or 
pattern, after which something may be made; archetypal" (oed.com) 
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